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ABSTRACT
We consider the problem of a principal who needs to elicit the true
worth of an object she owns from an agent who has a unique ability
to compute this information. The correctness of the information
cannot be verified by the principal, so it is important to incentivize
the agent to report truthfully. Previous works coped with this un-
verifiability by employing two or more information agents and
awarding them according to the correlation between their reports.
In this paper we show that even with only one information agent
truthful information can be elicited, as long as the object is valuable
for the agent too. In particular the paper introduces a mechanism
that, under mild realistic assumptions, is proved to elicit the infor-
mation truthfully, even when computing the information is costly
for the agent. Moreover, using this mechanism, the principal ob-
tains the truthful information incurring an arbitrarily small expense
beyond whatever unavoidable costs the setting dictates.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Often you own a potentially valuable object, such as an antique, a
jewel, a used car or a land-plot, but do not know its exact value and
cannot calculate it yourself. There are various scenarios in which
you may need to know the exact object value. For example: (a) You
intend to sell the object and want to know how much to ask when
negotiating with potential buyers. (b) You want to know how much
to invest in an insurance policy covering that object. (c) The object
is a part of an inheritance you manage in behalf of your co-heirs,
and you want to prove to them that you manage it appropriately.
Full version of a paper that appeared in the proceedings of the 18th International Confer-
ence on Autonomous Agents andMultiagent Systems (AAMAS 2019), N. Agmon, M. E. Tay-
lor, E. Elkind, M. Veloso (eds.), May 13–17, 2019, Montreal, Canada. © 2019 International
Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All
rights reserved.
(d) The object is a land-plot that might contain oil, and you want
to know whether to invest in developing it. (e) You are a firm and
required by law to include the value of assets you own in your
periodic report. (f) You are a government auctioning a public asset,
and want to publish an accurate value-estimate in order to attract
more firms to participate in the auction. Moreover, you may be
required by law (or by political pressure from your voters) to obtain
and disclose its true value, to avoid accusations of corruption.
A common solution in these situations is to buy the desired
information from an agent with an expertise in evaluating similar
objects [5, 6, 30]. Examples of such agents are: antique-shop owners,
jewelers, car-dealers, or oil-firms that own nearby land-plots and
thus can drill and estimate the prospects of finding oil in your plot.
The problem is that, in many cases, the information is not verifiable:
the information buyer (henceforth “the principal”) cannot tell if the
information received is correct. This results in a strong incentive
for the agent to provide an arbitrary value whenever the extraction
of the true value is costly or requires some effort, knowing the
principal will not be able to tell the difference. For example, if an
antique agent gives you a low appraisal for an antique object, and
you sell it for that low value, you will never know that you were
scammed.
Even if the true value can be verified later on (e.g, due to unsuc-
cessful drilling for oil), this might be too late — the damage due to
using the wrong value might be irreversible and the agent might
be too far away to be punished. Our goal is thus to —
— develop mechanisms that obtain the true value of an
object by incentivizing an agent to compute and report
it, even when it is costly for the agent, and even when
the information is unverifiable by the principal.
The literature on information elicitation usually makes one of two
assumptions: either the information is verifiable by the principal,
or there are two or more information agents such that reports can
be compared with peer reports [14]. We study a more challenging
setting in which the information is unverifiable, and yet there is
only a single agent who can provide it. At first glance this seems
impossible: how can the agent be incentivized to report truthfully
if there is no other source of information for comparison? We over-
come this impossibility by allowing, with some small probability,
the transfer of the object to the agent for some fee, as an alternative
means of compensation (instead of directly paying the agent for
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the information). This is applicable as long as the agent gains value
from owning the object, i.e., both capable of evaluating the object
and can benefit from owning it. This is quite common in real life.
For example, both the antique-shop owner and the car-dealer, who
play the role of the agent in the motivating settings above, can pro-
vide a true valuation for the car/antique based on their expertise,
and can also benefit from owning it (e.g. for resale). Similarly, the
oil-firm who owns nearby sea-plots has access to relevant informa-
tion enabling it to calculate the true value of the plot in question,
and will also benefit from owning that plot.
We use this principle of selling the object to the agent with a
small probability for designing amechanism for eliciting thewanted
information. Our analysis proves that the mechanism is truthful
whenever the information computation cost is sufficiently small
relative to the object’s expected value; the exact threshold depends
on the prior distribution of the value. For example, when the object
value is distributed uniformly, the mechanism is truthful whenever
the computation cost is less than 1/4 of the expected object value,
which is quite a realistic assumption (Section 3).
While our mechanism allows the principal to learn the true
information, this information does not come for free: the principal
“pays” for it by the risk of selling the object to the agent for a
price lower than its value. Our next goal, then, is to minimize
the principal’s loss subject to the requirement of true information
elicitation. We show that our mechanism parameters can be tuned
such that the principal’s expected loss is only slightly more than its
computation cost. This is an optimal guarantee, since the principal
could not get the information for less than its computation cost
even if she had the required expertise herself (Section 4).
We then show how the mechanism can be augmented to handle
some extensions of the basic model. These include the case where
the object is divisible, when the delivery of information is costly,
when the principal and the agent have different valuations for the
object, and when the cost the agent incurs when computing the
information is unknown to the principal (Section 5).
In addition to our main mechanism, we present two alterna-
tive mechanisms that differ in their privacy considerations, in the
sequence of roles (in the resulting Stackelberg game), and in the
nature of the decisions made by the different players. Interestingly,
despite their differences, all three mechanisms are equivalent in
terms of the guarantees they provide. This leads us to conjecture
that these guarantees are the best possible (Section 6).
Previous related work is surveyed in Section 7. Discussion and
suggested extensions for future work are given in Section 8.
2 THE MODEL
There is a principal who needs to know the true value of an object
she owns or a business opportunity available to her. The monetary
value of this object or opportunity for the principal is denoted by
v . While the principal does not know v , she has a prior probabil-
ity distribution on v , denoted by f (v), defined over the interval
[vmin,vmax], with 0 ≤ vmin < vmax.
The principal can interact with a single agent. Initially, the agent
too does not know v and knows only the prior distribution f (v).
However, the agent has a unique ability to compute v , by incurring
some cost c ≥ 0. Initially we assume that the cost c is common
knowledge; in Section 5.4 we relax this assumption.
The principal’s goal is to incentivize the agent to compute and
reveal the true v . However, the principal cannot verify v and has
no other sources of information besides the agent, so the incentives
cannot depend directly on whether v is correct.
Similar to the common value setting studied extensively in auc-
tion theory [27], our model assumes that the value of the object to
both the principal and the agent is the same. A realistic example of
this setting is when both the principal and the agent are oil firms:
the principal owns an oil field but does not know its value, while
the agent owns nearby fields and can gain information about the oil
field from its nearby drills. In Section 5.3 we relax this assumption
and allow the two values to be different.
The mechanism-design space available to the principal includes
transferring the object/opportunity to the agent, as well as offering
and/or requesting a payment to/from the agent. The principal has
the power to commit to the mechanism rules, i.e, the principal is
assumed to be truthful. The challenge is to design a mechanism
that will incentivize truthfulness on the side of the agent too.
The agent is assumed to be risk-neutral and have quasi-linear
utilities. I.e, the utility of the agent from getting the object for a
certain price is the object’s value minus the price paid. If the agent
calculates v , then the cost c is subtracted from his utility too.
The primary goal of the principal is to elicit the exact value v
from the agent. Subject to this, she wants to minimize her expected
loss, defined as the object valuev (if transferred to the agent) minus
the payments received.
3 TRUTHFUL VALUE-ELICITATION MECHANISM
The mechanism most commonly used in practice for eliciting in-
formation is to pay the agent the cost c (plus some profit margin)
in money. However, when information is not verifiable, monetary
payment alone cannot incentivize the agent to actually incur the
cost of calculation and report the true value.
Instead, in our mechanism, the principal “pays” to the agent by
transferring the object to the agent with some small probability.
The mechanism guarantees the agent’s truthfulness, meaning that,
under the right conditions (detailed below), a rational agent will
choose to incur all costs related to computing the correct value, and
report it truthfully. The mechanism is presented as Mechanism 1.
It is parametrized by a small positive constant ϵ , and a probability
distribution represented by its cumulative distribution function G.
Mechanism 1 Parameters: ϵ > 0: a constant, G(·): a cdf.
(1) The principal secretly selects r at random, distributed in the
following way:
• With probability ϵ , this r is distributed uniformly in
[vmin,vmax];
• With probability 1 − ϵ , this r is distributed like G(r ).
(2) The agent bids a value b.
(3) The principal reveals r and then:
• If b ≥ r , the principal gives the object to the agent, and
the agent pays r to the principal.
• If b < r , no transfers nor payments are made.
The underlying idea is to make the agent “feel like” in a Vickrey
auction. For the agent, the random price r is just like a second
price in a Vickrey auction; therefore, if the agent knows v , it is
optimal for him to bid b = v . The challenge is to show that it is
optimal for the agent to actually calculate v . This crucially depends
on the selection of the cdf G(r ). Below we prove a necessary and
sufficient condition for the existence of an appropriate G(r ). We
assume throughout the analysis that ϵ is positive but infinitesimally
small (i.e, ϵ → 0).
Theorem 3.1. There exists a functionG(r ) with which Mechanism
1 is truthful, if-and-only-if c < Ev [max(0,v − E[v])]. One cdf with
which the mechanism is truthful in this case is:
G∗(r ) = 1r>E[v] (1)
Before proving the theorem, we illustrate its practical applicabil-
ity with some examples.
Example 3.2. v is uniform in [0, 2M]. Then E[max(0,v −E[v])] =
M/4 so Mechanism 1 is applicable iff c < M/4 — the object’s ap-
praisal cost should be less than one quarter of the object’s expected
value. With the function G∗ in (1), Mechanism 1 selects r in the
following way: with probability ϵ , r is selected uniformly at random
from [vmin,vmax]; with probability 1 − ϵ , r = E[v].
Example 3.3. v has a symmetric triangular distribution in [0, 2M]
with meanM . Here, Mechanism 1 is applicable iff c < M/6.
Both these conditions are realistic, since usually the cost of ap-
praising an object is at least one order of magnitude less than the
object’s expected value. For example, used cars usually cost tens of
thousands of dollars (even very cheap ones cost at least $2000), and
the cost of a pre-purchase car inspection generally ranges from $100
to $200. Similarly, a used engagement ring typically costs thousands
of dollars, while hourly rates of a diamond ring appraisals range
from $50 to $150.
• If v is distributed uniformly in [0,M], then Mechanism 1 is
applicable iff c < M/8.
• If v is a discrete random variable that equals 0 with proba-
bility q andM with probability 1 − q, then Mechanism 1 is
applicable iff c < q(1 − q)M .
• If v is distributed exponentially with mean λ, then the mech-
anism is applicable iff c < λ/e (where e ≈ 2.7..).
• If v is distributed exponentially with mean λ, then the mech-
anism is applicable iff c < λ/e (where e ≈ 2.7..), which can
be quite high.
It is reasonable to assume that the cost c of calculating an object’s
value is at least one order of magnitude lower than its maximum
possible value (for example, the cost of appraising a car is at most
several hundreds while the maximum possible value of a car might
be hundreds of thousands). Thus, the mechanism is applicable in
the uniform and exponential case, and also in the discrete case
when q ∈ [0.12, 0.88].
Proof of Theorem 3.1. The agent has essentially two possible
strategies. We call them, following Faltings and Radanovic [14],
“cooperative” and “heuristic”:
• In the cooperative strategy, the agent computes v and uses
the result to determine a bid b(v).
• In the heuristic strategy, the agent does not compute v , and
determines b based only on the prior f (v).
The agent will use the cooperative strategy iff its expected utility
is larger than the expected utility of the heuristic strategy by more
than c . Therefore in the following paragraphs we calculate the
expected utility of the agent in each strategy, showing that under
the condition given in the theorem there always exists a cdf G
for which the above holds and otherwise the condition cannot
hold. For the formal analysis we denote by Ĝ the integral of G:
Ĝ(v) :=
∫ v
r=0G(r )dr .
In the cooperative strategy, the agent gets the object iff r ≤ b(v),
and then his utility is v − r . Therefore his expected utility is: 1∫ b(v)
r=0
[
(1 − ϵ)G ′(r ) + ϵ
vmax −vmin
]
(v − r )dr
The integrand is positive iff r < v . Therefore the expression is max-
imized when b(v) = v , and hence it is a strictly dominant strategy
for the agent to bidv . In this case, his utility is (1−ϵ)
∫ v
r=0G
′(r )(v −
r )dr + ϵvmax−vmin
∫ v
r=0(v − r )dr . We assume that ϵ → 0,2 so that
the gain is approximately
∫ v
r=0G
′(r )(v − r )dr . By integrating by
parts, one can see that this expression equals Ĝ(v). Hence, before
knowing v , the expected utility of the agent from the cooperative
strategy, denotedUcoop(G), is:
Ucoop(G) = E[Ĝ(v)]
where E denotes expectation taken over the prior f (v).
In the heuristic strategy, the agent’s expected utility as a function
of the bid b is:
E
[∫ b
r=0
[(1 − ϵ)G ′(r ) + ϵ
vmax −vmin ](v − r )dr
]
=
∫ b
r=0
[(1 − ϵ)G ′(r ) + ϵ
vmax −vmin ](E[v] − r )dr .
The integrand is positive iff r < E[v], so it is a strictly dominant
strategy for the agent to bid b = E[v]. In this case, his gain when
ϵ → 0, denotedUheur(G), is:
Uheur(G) = Ĝ(E[v])
The net utility of the agent from being cooperative rather than
heuristic is the difference:
Unet(G) := Ucoop(G) −Uheur(G) = E[Ĝ(v)] − Ĝ(E[v]) (2)
The mechanism is truthful iff Unet(G) > c , i.e, the net utility of
the agent from being cooperative is larger than the cost of being
cooperative. Therefore, it remains to show that there is a cdf G
satisfying c < Unet(G), iff c < Ev [max(0,v − E[v])]. This is equiva-
lent to showing that Ev [max(0,v − E[v])] is the maximum possible
1 We consider only cdfsG that are continuous and differentiable almost everywhere,
so G′ is well-defined almost everywhere. In points in which G is discontinuous (i.e.,
has a jump), G′ can be defined using Dirac’s delta function.
2 If ϵ = 0, then reporting the true v is only a weakly-dominant strategy: the agent
never gains from reporting a false value, but may be indifferent between false and
true value. For example, if the true value is 2 and the cdf is uniform in [3, 5] and zero
elsewhere, then the agent is indifferent between reporting 1 and reporting 2, since
in both cases he loses the object with probability 1. Making ϵ even slightly above 0
prevents this indifference and makes reportingv strictly better than any other strategy.
However, to attain this strict-truthfulness, it is sufficient to have ϵ arbitrarily small.
Hence, in the following analysis we assume for simplicity that ϵ → 0.
value ofUnet(G), over all cdfsG . This is a non-trivial maximization
problem since we have to maximize over a set of functions. We first
present an intuitive solution and then a formal solution.
Intuitively, to maximize E[Ĝ(v)] − Ĝ(E[v]) we have to make
Ĝ(E[v]) as small as possible, and subject to that, make Ĝ as large as
possible. The smallest possible value of Ĝ is 0, so we let Ĝ(E[v]) = 0.
Therefore we must have G(r ) = 0 for all r ≤ E[v]. Now, to make Ĝ
as large as possible, we must let it increase at the largest possible
speed from E[v] onwards; therefore we must make its derivative
G as large as possible, so we let G(r ) = 1 for all r > E[v]. All in all,
the optimal G is the step function: G∗(r ) = 1r>E[v], which gives
Unet(G∗) = E[max(0,v − E[v])] as claimed.
To prove this formally, we use mathematical tools that have been
previously used in the analysis of revenue-maximizing mechanisms
[22, 29]. In particular, we use Bauer’s maximization principle:
In a convex and compact set, every linear function
has a maximum value, and it is attained in an extreme
point of the set — a point that is not the midpoint of
any interval contained in the set.
Denote by G the set of all cumulative distribution functions with
support contained in [vmin,vmax]. G is a convex set, since any
convex combination of cdfs is also a cdf. Moreover, it is compact
with respect to the sup-norm topology (see Manelli and Vincent
[29]). The objective functionUnet(·) is linear. Therefore, to find its
maximum value it is sufficient to consider the extreme points of G.
We claim that the only extreme points of G are 0-1 step functions —
functionsG for whichG(r ) ∈ {0, 1} for all r . Indeed, suppose thatG
is not a step function, so there is some r0 for which 0 < G(r0) < 1.
Then the following two functions are different elements of G:
G1(r ) = min(1, 2G(r ))
G2(r ) = max(0, 2G(r ) − 1)
G is the midpoint of the segmentG1–G2 (see the figure below), so
G is not an extreme point of G.
Therefore, it is sufficient to maximizeUnet on cdfs of the follow-
ing form, for some parameter t ∈ [vmin,vmax]:
Gt (r ) = 1r>t
Integrating Gt (r ) yields Ĝt (v) = max(0,v − t), so by (2):
Unet(Gt ) =E[max(0,v − t)] −max(0,E[v] − t)
=
∫ vmax
v=t
(v − t)f (v)dv +min(0, t − E[v])
To find the t that maximizes Unet(Gt ), we take its derivative with
respect to t :
• The derivative of the leftmost term is −
∫ vmax
v=t f (v)dv =− Pr[v ≥ t], which is always between 0 and −1.
• The derivative of the rightmost term is 1 when t < E[v] and
0 when t > E[v].
Therefore, Unet(Gt ) is increasing when t < E[v] and decreasing
when t > E[v]. Therefore its maximum is attained for t = E[v] and
it is E[max(0,v − E[v])] as claimed. □
4 MINIMIZING THE PRINCIPAL’S LOSS
The functionG∗ from the proof of Theorem 3.1 allows the principal
to elicit true information for a large range of costs. However, the
information does not come for free: the principal “pays” for the
information by the possibility of giving away the object. As stated
earlier, obtaining the information is mandatory. Hence, the principal
naturally seeks to minimize the loss resulting from giving away
the object. In other words, from the set of all cdfs with which
Mechanism 1 is truthful, the principal would like to choose a single
cdf G (possibly different than G∗) which minimizes her loss.
The principal loses utility whenever the agent gets the object,
i.e., whenever the agent bids v > r . In this case, the principal’s net
loss is v − r . Therefore, the expected loss of the principal (when
ϵ → 0), denoted Lnet(G), is:
Lnet(G) := Ev
[∫ v
r=0
G ′(r )(v − r )dr
]
A simple calculation shows that this expression equals Ev [Ĝ(v)],
which is exactly Ucoop(G) — the utility of the agent from playing
the cooperative strategy. This is not surprising as the agent and the
principal are playing a zero-sum game.
To induce cooperative behavior,Ucoop(G)must equal c ′, for some
c ′ > c . Therefore the principal’s loss must be c ′ too. Fortunately,
the principal can attain this loss even for c ′ arbitrarily close to c .
We define:
pc ′ :=
c ′
Ev [max(0,v − E[v])]
Gc ′(r ) := pc ′ · 1r>E[v] + (1 − pc ′) · 1r=vmax (3)
With this Gc ′ , Mechanism 1 selects r as follows. With probability
pc ′ , r is selected using the function G∗ from (1), which guarantees
the agent a utility of Ev [max(0,v − E[v])]. With probability 1−pc ′ ,
the principal chooses r so large that the agent never gets the object.
Therefore the expected utility of the agent is pc ′ · Ev [max(0,v −
E[v])] = c ′. Consequently the loss of the principal is c ′ too. When
c ′ → c , the principal’s loss approaches the theoretic lower bound —
she obtains the information for only slightly more than its compu-
tation cost.
The probability that the principal has to sell the object is quite
low in realistic settings. For example, consider the case mentioned
in Example 3.2 wherev is uniform in [0, 2M]. Suppose the object is a
car. Typical values are c =$200 andM =$40K. Here pc = c/(M/4) =
0.02. So the information is computed and delivered truthfully with
probability 1, whereas with probability 98% the principal keeps
the car (and incurs no loss), and with probability 2% the principal
sells the car for its expected value of $40K (and loses the difference
v − $40K ).
An interesting special case is c = 0, i.e., the agent already knows
v . In this case, the principal does not need to know the prior distri-
bution f (v) and can simply use
G0(r ) := δ + (1 − δ ) · 1r=vmax (4)
If δ > 0, the agent’s net utility is positive so the mechanism is
truthful; when δ → 0, the principal’s loss approaches 0.
5 VARIANTS AND EXTENSIONS
The proposed mechanism can be augmented in various ways to
support extensions of the underlying model.
5.1 Divisible objects
So far we assumed the object is indivisible, so it is either sold entirely
to the agent or not at all. In general the object may be divisible.
For example, it may be possible to sell only a part of an oil field, or
only sell shares in the field’s future profits. In this case, instead of
using the functionGc ′(r ) of (3), we can run Mechanism 1 using the
function G∗(r ), but if the object needs to be sold in step 3 — only a
fraction pc ′ of it is actually sold. The analysis of this mechanism is
the same — cooperation is still a dominant strategy for the agent
whenever c < c ′, and the principal’s loss is still c ′. The advantage
is that a risk-averse agent may prefer to buy a fraction pc ′ of the
object with certainty, than to buy the entire object with probability
pc ′ . Moreover, a risk-averse principal may prefer to keep a fraction
1 − pc ′ of the object with certainty, than to risk selling the entire
object with probability pc ′ .
5.2 Cost of information delivery
So far we assumed that the information production is costly, but
once the information is available — its delivery is free. In general,
the information delivery might also be costly. For example, the
agent might have to write a detailed report about how v was cal-
culated, and have the report signed by the firm’s accountants. The
agent incurs the cost of delivery whether the delivered information
is true or false. The principal can handle this case by promising the
agent to pay the delivery cost if the agent participates in Mecha-
nism 1. This makes the strategic situation of the agent identical to
the situation analyzed in Section 3. Mechanism 1 is still truthful
whenever c < Ev [max(0,v − E[v])]. The principal’s loss is the sum
of the production and delivery costs, which is the smallest loss
possible since the agent’s expenses must be covered.
5.3 Different values
So far we assumed that the object’s value is the same for the prin-
cipal and the agent. In general the values might be different. For
example, suppose the principal the owner of a used car and the
agent is a car dealer. While the dealer certainly has a positive value
for owning the car, it may be lower (in case the dealer already has
several cars of the same model) or higher (in case the dealer can fix
the car at a reduced cost) than its value for the car owner.
Let vp be the object’s value for the principal and va its value
for the agent. The agent’s utility is calculated as before, using va
instead of v :
Ucoop(G) = E[Ĝ(va )] Uheur(G) = Ĝ(E[va ])
Unet(G) = E[Ĝ(va )] − Ĝ(E[va ]) (5)
Therefore, using the cdf G∗(r ) := 1r>E[va ], Mechanism 1 is still
truthful and elicitsva , as long as the condition of Theorem 3.1 holds
on va , i.e.:
c < E[max(0,va − E[va ])
Ifva andvp are correlated, then the principal can use the knowledge
of va to gain some knowledge about vp .
However, in contrast to the common-value setting, the game
here is no longer zero-sum — the principal’s loss does not equal the
agent’s utility, so it may be larger or smaller than c . The principal’s
expected loss is now:
Lnet(G) := E
[∫ va
r=0
G ′(r )(vp − r )dr
]
= E
[
Ĝ(va ) + (vp −va ) ·G(va )
]
= Ucoop(G) + E
[(vp −va ) ·G(va )] (6)
So, when vp > va the principal’s loss is larger than the agent’s
utility, and when vp < va it is smaller.
Suppose we want the agent’s net utility to be at least c ′, for some
c ′ > c . Then, the principal’s minimization problem is:
minimize E
[
Ĝ(va )] + E
[(vp −va ) ·G(va )]
subject to G ∈ G and E[Ĝ(va )] − Ĝ(E[va ]) ≥ c ′
This is still a problem of minimizing a linear goal over a convex
set of functions, so the minimum is still attained in the extreme
points of the set. However, finding the extreme points and minimiz-
ing G over that points is much harder. We leave it to the future.3
5.4 Unknown Cost of Computation
So far, we assumed that the principal knows the costs incurred by
the agent. This assumption is realistic in many cases. For example,
when the object is a car, the mechanic can reveal its condition by
running a set of standard checks that consume a known amount of
time, so their cost can be reasonably estimated. However, in some
cases the cost might be known only to the agent. In this subsection
we assume that the principal only knows a prior distribution on c ,
given by pdf h and cdf H , with support [cmin, cmax]. For simplicity
we consider here the common value setting, vp = va = v .
If the principal must get the information at all costs (e.g., due
to regulatory requirements), then she can simply run Mechanism
1 with the cdf Gc ′ of (3), taking c ′ = cmax. This ensures that the
agent calculates and reports the true information whenever cmax <
E[max(0,v − E[v])], and the principal’s loss is ≈ cmax.
3 To get an idea of the loss magnitude, consider a special case in which va and vp are
fully correlated: suppose there is a constant a such that va = a · vp . Suppose also,
for the sake of the example, that vp is distributed uniformly in [0, 2M ]. Suppose the
principal uses Mechanism 1 with the Gc′ of (3). Then, using the expressions in the
text body, we find that the principal’s loss is at most (3/a − 2) · c ′. So when a = 1
the principal’s loss is exactly c ′ (which may be very near c ), but when a < 1 the
loss is more than c ′ and when a > 1 the loss is less than c ′, as can be expected. It is
interesting that the loss (when a is fixed) is linear function of c ′. We do not know if
this is true in general.
However, in some cases the principal might think that cmax is
too much to pay for the information. In this case, it may be useful
for the principal to determine a utility of obtaining the information.
We denote the principal’s utility from knowing the information by
u, and assume that it is measured in the same monetary units as
the function Lnet of Section 4. In other words, the principal’s loss
is:
• Lnet(G) — when she elicits the true value using Mechanism
1 with cdf G;
• u — when she does not elicit the true value.
If u < cmax, it is definitely not optimal for the principal to use
Mechanism 1 with the cdf Gc ′ taking c ′ = cmax. What should the
principal do in this case?
To gain insight on this situation, we compare it to bilateral trad-
ing. In standard bilateral trading, a single consumer wants to buy a
physical product from a single producer; in our setting, the prin-
cipal is the consumer, the agent is the producer, and the “product”
is information. This is like bilateral trading, with the additional
difficulty that the consumer cannot verify the “product” received.
The case when the production cost c is unknown in bilateral
trading was studied by Baron and Myerson [9]. They define the
virtual cost function of the producer by:
z(c) := c + H (c)
h(c) (c ∈ [c
min, cmax])
(it is analogous to the virtual valuation function used in Myerson’s
optimal auction theory). By Myerson’s theorem, the expected loss
of the consumer in any truthful mechanism equals the expected
virtual cost of the producer in that mechanism, Ec [z(c)]. The “loss”
of the consumer from not buying the product is her utility from
having this product, which we denote by u. Therefore, to minimize
her expected loss, the consumer should buy the product if-and-
only-if z(c) < u.
Under standard regularity assumptions on h, the virtual cost
function z(c) is increasing with c . In that case, the optimal mecha-
nism for the consumer is to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to buy
the product for a price of:
Rz,u =

0 if u < z(cmin)
z−1(u) if z(cmin) ≤ u ≤ z(cmax)
cmax if z(cmax) < u
(7)
With this mechanism, the producer agrees to sell the product iff
c < Rz,u , which occurs iff z(c) < u.
We now return to our original setting, in which the “product” is
the information about an object’s value. We emphasize that there
are two values: the value for both agents of the object itself, which
we denoted by v , and the value for the principal of knowing v ,
which we denote here by u. We assume that the object’s value v
and the cost c of computing v are independent random variables.
Similarly to the setting of Baron and Myerson [9], the principal
has to ensure that the agent sells the information iff z(c) < u, which
happens iff c < Rz,u . Analogously to equations (3), we define:
pz,u =
Rz,u
Ev [max(0,v − E[v])]
Gz,u (r ) = pz,u · 1r>E[v] + (1 − pz,u ) · 1r=vmax
The principal has to run Mechanism 1 using Gz,u as the cdf. As
explained after equations (3), this gives the agent an expected net
utility of Rz,u , so the agent will agree to participate in the mecha-
nism iff c < Rz,u . This decision rule of the agent is in fact the one
that maximizes the expected utility of the principal.
Example 5.1. Suppose the cost c is distributed uniformly in
[0, cmax]. Then, the virtual cost function is z(c) = 2c , so z−1(u) =
u/2 and Rz,u = min(cmax,u/2).
Consider first a physical product. If u > 2cmax, then the con-
sumer offers cmax, the producer always sells, and the consumer’s
loss is cmax. If u < 2cmax, then the consumer offers u/2 and the
producer sells only if the cost is less than u/2. This happens with
probability u2cmax , so the consumer’s expected loss is
u
2cmax · u2 +
(1 − u2cmax ) · u = u · (1 − u4cmax ), which is less than cmax.
Now suppose that the “product” is information about an ob-
ject’s value. Suppose that, a priori, the object’s value is distributed
uniformly in [0, 2M]. As calculated in Example 3.2, in this case
E[max(0,v − E[v])] = M/4. We make the realistic assumption that
cmax < M/4 (the maximum possible cost for appraising an object
is less than a quarter of the expected value of the object). Therefore
the following expression defines a valid probability:
pz,u =
min(cmax,u/2)
M/4
The principal should run Mechanism 1 with the cdf Gz,u (r ) =
pz,u ·1r>E[v] + (1−pz,u ) ·1r=vmax . The expected net utility of the
agent from participating isUnet(Gz,u ) = min(cmax,u/2).
If u > 2cmax, then Unet(Gz,u ) = cmax, so the agent always par-
ticipates, and the principal always obtains the information for an
expected loss of cmax.
If u < 2cmax, then Unet(Gz,u ) = u/2 and it might be higher or
lower than the actual cost c . If c < u/2 then the agent participates
and the principal obtains the information for an expected loss ofu/2;
if c > u/2 then the agent refuses to participate and the principal
does not obtain the information, so her loss is u. All in all, the
principal’s expected loss is u2cmax · u2 + (1− u2cmax ) ·u = u · (1− u4cmax ),
which is less than cmax.
6 ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS
In addition to Mechanism 1, we developed two alternative mecha-
nisms for solving the same problem — eliciting a true value from a
single information agent.
In Mechanism 2 below, the price of the object is not determined
by the principal but rather calculated as a function of the agent’s
bid, similarly to a first-price auction.
Mechanism 2 Parameters: ϵ > 0: a constant, G(r ): a cdf.
(1) The agent bids b ∈ [vmin,vmax].
(2) With probability G(b), the agent buys the object for:
b − Ĝ(b)/G(b)
where Ĝ is the integral of G: Ĝ(b) =
∫ b
r=vmin G(r )dr .
In Mechanism 3 below, there is no bid at all — the principal
publicly posts a price and the agent decides whether to buy the
object at this price or not.
Mechanism 3 Parameters: t > 0 — a constant, p ∈ [0, 1] — a
probability.
(1) The principal publicly posts the price t .
(2) The principal asks the agent whether he wants to buy the
object for t or not.
(3) If the agent say yes, then with probability p he buys the
object from the principal for t . Otherwise the object is not
sold.
(4) If the object is not sold in step 3, then the principal runs
Mechanism 1 with the function G0 of equation (4).
The three mechanisms are apparently different in various as-
pects such as the role of the different players in the underlying
Stackelberg game (leader vs. follower), and whether or not there is
a requirement for secrecy (Mechanism 1 requires to keep r secret
while Mechanism 2 need no secrecy). Interestingly, they are equiva-
lent in the conditions they impose on the cost c and the principal’s
loss. We present a proof sketch below. Note that we consider the
general case of different valuations of the agent and the principal
(as in Subsection 5.3) — the agent’s value is va and the principal’s
value is vp .
InMechanism 2, the agent’s expected utility for bidding b is:
G(b) · (va − b + Ĝ(b)/G(b))
The agent calculates the optimal bid b by solving an optimization
problem. The derivative w.r.t. b is:
G ′ · (va − b + Ĝ/G) +G · (−1 + (G2 − ĜG ′)/(G2))
=G ′ · (va − b)
Since G is an increasing function, this expression is positive when
b < va and negative when b > va . Therefore the expected utility of
the agent is maximized by bidding b = va . In this case his expected
utility is:
Ucoop(G) = E[G(va ) · (va −va + Ĝ(va )/G(va ))] = E[Ĝ(va )]
Similarly, when the agent does not compute va , his utility is opti-
mized by bidding b = E[va ], which gives him a utility of:
Uheur(G) = Ĝ(E[va ])
These utilities are exactly as in Mechanism 1 and Equation (5).
Therefore, Theorem 3.1 is valid as-is for Mechanism 2, and the
mechanism is applicable iff c < E[max(0,va − E[va ])], using the
same cdf G∗ of (1).
Moreover, the principal’s loss Lnet is exactly as in equation (6).
Therefore the principal has to solve the same optimization problem
for minimizing the loss, and the minimal loss is the same. In partic-
ular, in the common value setting va = vp , the principal’s loss can
be made arbitrarily close to the information production cost c .
InMechanism 3, in step 2, the agent has to decide whether to
buy the object or not. Calculating the true value va may help the
agent decide:
• If the agent calculatesva , he buys the object with probability
p iff va > t , so his utility is E[p ·max(0,va − t)].
• Otherwise, he buys the object iff E[va ] > t , so his expected
utility is p ·max(0,E[va ] − t).
In case the agent decides to calculate va , in step 3 the situation is
similar to the c = 0 case mentioned at the end of Section 4 — the
agent already knows the information so the cost for calculating it
now is 0. Therefore, at step 4 the principal elicits the true informa-
tion for almost zero additional loss. Define the following functions
(depending on the mechanism parameters p, t ):
G(r ) := p · 1r>t
Ĝ(v) :=
∫ v
r=0
G(r )dr = p ·max(0,v − t)
With these definitions, the agent’s utilities when computing / not
computingva are exactly as in equation (5), and the principal’s loss
in step 2 is the same as in equation (6). So Theorem 3.1 is valid, and
the mechanism is truthful iff c < E[max(0,va − E[va ])], by taking
t = E[va ] and p > cE[max(0,va−E[va ])] .
Additionally, Mechanism 1 itself can be extended by adding
a probability of sale — before actually selling the object to the
agent for r , the principal tosses a biased coin with probability p
of success (where p is a fixed parameter), and makes the sale only
in case of success. This extension is actually already supported by
the current mechanism: for any cdf G and parameter p, we can
create a new cdfGp by putting a probability mass of 1−p on values
larger than vmax and a probability mass of p on the original G.
This attains exactly the same effect as a sale with probability p,
since with probability 1 − p, the r will be so high that the object
will never be sold. Hence, Theorem 3.1 applies to this extension
too, so even with this generalization, the mechanism works iff
c < E[max(0,v − E[v])].
The fact that several different mechanisms lead to the same
applicability conditions and loss expressions lead us to conjecture
that these results are valid universally.
Conjecture. (a) There exists a mechanism for truthfully eliciting
a single agent’s value va , if-and-only-if:
c < E[max(0,va − E[va ])].
(b) In any mechanism for truthfully eliciting va from a single
agent, the principal’s loss is at least:
c + min
G ∈Gc
E[(vp −va ) ·G(va )],
where theminimization is over all cumulative distribution functions
satisfying E[Ĝ(va )] = c .
While our main goal in showing three inherently different mech-
anisms is primarily theoretic (supporting our conjecture), there are
some practical advantages for preferring the use of some of them
in specific cases. For example, an advantage of Mechanism 2 is that
it does not require a mediator. Mechanism 1 requires a mediator
to keep the reservation value r secret and reveal it only after the
agent’s bid (and this recurs in Mechanism 3 as it requires the princi-
pal to run also Mechanism 1 entirely). The mediator might collude
with the agent and reveal the reservation value to him before the
bid, allowing him to bid r +ϵ and win the object without giving any
information. The mediator might also collude with the principal
and reveal a false reservation value b − ϵ after hearing the bid b. In
Mechanism 2 no such problems arise.
Additionally, Mechanism 1 requires the agent to believe that
the principal really draws r from the advertised distribution (or
alternatively, use a third-party for doing the lottery). In Mechanism
2 the lottery is much simpler: a probability p = G(b) is calculated
in a transparent manner, and the object is sold with probability p.
Such lottery can be carried out transparently in front of the agent,
so no trust is required.
On the other hand, Mechanism 1 has the advantage that the
optimal strategy of bidding v is more intuitive. In Mechanism 2,
once the agent knows v , he needs to solve a complex optimization
problem in order to calculate the optimal b and realize that it equals
v . In contrast, in Mechanism 1, once the agent knows v , it is easy
to realize that it is optimal to bid v : by bidding higher he might buy
the object at a price higher than its value, and by bidding lower he
might miss buying the object at a price lower than its value.
7 RELATEDWORK
Mechanisms by which an uninformed agent tries to elicit informa-
tion from an informed agent are as old as King Solomon’s judgment
(I Kings:3). About two centuries ago, the German poet Goethe in-
vented a mechanism for eliciting the value of his new book from
his publisher [30], but without considering the computation cost.
Various new mechanisms for truthful information elicitation
have been studied in recent years, including mechanisms based on
proper scoring rules [7, 26], the Bayesian truth serum [10, 35, 39], and
its variants [32, 42], the peer truth serum [36], the ESP game, credit-
based mechanisms [19], and similar output agreement mechanisms
[38]. See also Kong and Schoenebeck [28] for a recent unifying
framework for several different kinds of mechanisms. Faltings and
Radanovic [14] provide a comprehensive survey of such mecha-
nisms in the computer science literature. They classify them into
two categories:
The principle underlying all truthful mechanisms is
to reward reports according to consistency with a
reference. (1) In the case of verifiable information, this
reference is taken from the ground truth as it will
eventually be available. (2) In the case of unverifiable
information, it will be constructed from peer reports
provided by other agents.
The present paper provides a third category: the information is
unverifiable, and yet there is a single agent to elicit it from. 4
Interactions between an informed agent and an uninformed
principal have also been studied extensively in economics. A typical
setting is that the agent is a seller holding an object and the principal
is a buyer wanting that object (contrary to our setting, where the
principal is the object owner). In some settings, the agent is a
manager of a firm and the principal is a potential investor. Common
4 When there are many agents, our problem becomes easier. For example, with three
agents the following mechanism is possible: (a) Offer each agent to sell you the
information for c + δ . (b) Collect the reports of all agreeing agents. (c) If one report is
not identical to at least one other report, then file a complaint against this agent and
send her to jail. This creates a coordination game where the focal point is to reveal the
true value, like in the ESP game. In our setting there is a single agent, so this trick is
not possible.
to all cases is that the agent holds information that may affect the
utility of the principal, and the question is if and how the agent can
be induced to disclose this information.
The seminal work of Akerlof [1] shows that, when information
is not verifiable and is not guaranteed to be correct (as in our
setting), the incentive of the agent to provide false information
might lead to complete market failure. In contrast, if the information
is ex-post verifiable (i.e, the agent can hide information but cannot
present false information), then market forces may be sufficient to
push the agent to voluntarily disclose his information [17, 18, 20].
Mechanisms for information elicitation have been developed for
settings where the information is verifiable [21], partially verifiable
[15, 16] or verifiable at a cost [11, 13, 31, 41].
An additional line of research assumes that the information
is unverifiable, however, if it is purchased, it is always correct.
Moreover, their goal is to maximize the agent’s revenue rather than
minimize the principal’s loss [2–4, 8, 37].
Our work is also related to contract theory [12], in which a prin-
cipal tries to incentivize an agent to choose an action that is fa-
vorable to the principal. There, while the principal cannot observe
the agent’s action, she can observe the (probabilistic) outcome of
his action. In contrast, in our setting the principal has no way of
knowing whether or not the agent calculated the true information.
Our work is motivated by government auctions for oil and gas
fields. A lease for mining oil/gas is put to a first-price sealed-bid
auction. One of the participating firms owns a nearby plot and can,
by drilling in its own plot, compute relevant information about the
potential value of the auctioned plot. Hendricks et al. [25] show that,
in equilibrium, the informed firm underbids and gains information
rent, while the uninformed firms have zero expected value. Porter
[34] provides empirical evidence supporting this conclusion from
almost 40 years of auctions by the US government. It indicates that
information asymmetry causes the government to lose about 30%
of the potential revenue. As a solution, Hendricks et al. [24] suggest
to exclude the agent from the auction and induce him to reveal the
information by promising him a fixed percentage of the auction
revenues. However, they note that in practice it may be impossible
to exclude a firm from a government auction. Our mechanism
provides a different solution: the government (the principal) can
use our mechanism to elicit the information from the informed firm
(the agent). Then it can release the information to the other firms
and by this remove the information asymmetry.
The decision rule in our Theorem 3.1 is somewhat similar to
the ones used in optimal stopping problems, e.g., the one derived
by Weitzman [40] for Pandora’s Box problem. While the latter
considers a single player and has no strategic aspect, our model
considers a strategic setting. Still the essence of the decision is
somehow similar as it consider the marginal expected profit from
knowing the true value (as opposed to acting based on the best
value found so far in Pandora’s problem, or the expected value in
our case).
Mechanism 1 uses the reservation-price concept, which can be
found in literature on auctions where agents have to incur a cost for
learning their own value. For example, Hausch and Li [23] discuss
an auction for a single item with a common value. Each bidder
incurs a cost for participating in the auction, and additional cost for
estimating the value of the item. Persico [33] discuss an extended
model where the bidders can pay to make their estimate of the
value more informative.
8 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
Information-providers are now ubiquitous, enabling people and
agents to acquire information of various sorts. As self-interested
agents, information providers typically seek to maximize their rev-
enue. This is where the failure of direct payment becomes apparent,
especially when the information provided is non-verifiable. The
importance of the mechanisms provided and analyzed in the paper
is therefore in their guarantee for truthfulness in the information
elicitation process.
An important challenge for future work is to study the theo-
retic limitations of the setting studied in this paper — a single
information-agent and unverifiable information. In particular, we
conjecture that any truthful mechanism for this setting must sell
the object with a positive probability, although we did not yet prove
this formally. Settling the conjecture in Section 6 is an interesting
challenge too. Some other directions for future work are:
Unknown distribution of value. Mechanism 1 requires to calcu-
late Ev [max(0,v − E[v])], which requires knowledge of the prior
distribution of v . When the distribution is not known, truthfulness
can be guaranteed only when c = 0, since in this case G can be
chosen independently of the distribution (see end of subsection
4). It is interesting whether true information can be elicited by a
prior-free mechanism also for c > 0.
Risk-averse agents. The current model assumes that the agent
is risk-neutral, so that his utility from a random mechanism is the
expectation of the value. It is interesting to check what happens in
the common case in which the agent is risk-averse. Suppose there is
an increasing function u : R→ R that maps the value of the agent
to his utility. So u(0) = 0 (no value means no utility) and u ′(x) > 0
for all x (more value always means more utility). When the agent is
risk-neutral (as we assumed so far), u ′ is constant; when the agent
is risk-averse, u ′ is decreasing. Then, when the agent is cooperative
and computes v , he gets the object iff r ≤ b(v), and then his utility
is u(v − r ). Therefore his expected utility is:∫ b(v)
r=0
[
(1 − ϵ)G ′(r ) + ϵ
vmax −vmin
]
u(v − r )dr
Sinceu(v−r ) is positive iffv−r is positive, the integrand is positive
iff r < v . Therefore the expression is maximized whenb(v) = v , and
hence it is still a strictly dominant strategy for the agent to bidb = v .
This is encouraging, since it means that at least the second part
of Mechanism 1 (revealing the value after it is computed) remains
truthful regardless of the agent’s risk attitude. However, computing
the agent’s utility in the cooperative vs. the heuristic strategy is
much harder.
Different effort levels. In our setting, the agent has only two
options: either calculate the accurate value, or not calculate it at
all. When c > Ev [max(0,v − E[v])], it is optimal for the agent to
not calculate the value at all. Then, it is optimal for the agent to bid
E[v]. It is never optimal for the agent to bid an inaccurate value.
In more realistic settings, the agent may have three or more
options. For example, it is possible that the agent can, by incurring
a cost c ′ < c , get an inaccurate estimate of v (e.g., the agent learns
some value u such that the true value is distributed uniformly in
[u − d,u + d], where d is the inaccuracy parameter). Then, the
analysis of the agent’s behavior becomes more complex since there
are more paths in which the agent may decide to calculate the
true value: he may decide to incur the cost c already from the
start, or incur only the cost c ′, and after observing the results —
decide whether to incur an additional cost of c . The principal’s
goal is to learn the true value at the end — regardless of how many
intermediate calculations are done by the agent. It is interesting to
characterize the mechanisms that let the principal attain this goal.
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